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FEDERAL LAND RECLAMATION IN 
THE DUST BOWL 
R. DOUGLAS HURT 
NATIONAL LAND-USE PLANNING 
In the spring of 1932, dust clouds swept 
over portions of the southern Great Plains. For 
the next six years, drought and the prevailing 
winds wreaked havoc over fifty million acres 
across northeastern New Mexico, southeastern 
Colorado, western Kansas, and the panhan-
dles of Texas and Oklahoma-an area known 
by 1935 as the Dust Bowl. Much of that 
acreage was submarginal-land that, given the 
price of wheat, did not merit cultivation-and 
it was easily windblown. Tillage with one-way 
disk plows pulverized the powder-dry soil, and 
the nearly constant winds blew and drifted it 
across crop and grasslands. During the remain-
der of the decade, the United States Depart-
ment of Agriculture (USDA) and other 
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government agencies struggled to halt wind 
erosion and to restore the land in the Dust 
Bowl. l 
Their work mandated the development of a 
federal land policy that would enable govern-
ment officials to help farmers reclaim their 
wind-eroded lands. Recognition of the need 
for a new federal land policy, however, was not 
new. For nearly a decade social scientists, such 
as L. C. Gray in the Bureau of Agricultural 
Economics of the USDA, had urged a compre-
hensive land-use program that would remove 
submarginal land from production to help 
solve the joint problems of surplus production 
and soil erosion. And in 1931 Gray influenced 
the Hoover administration to call a national 
conference on land utilization. When the 
delegates from the land-grant colleges, farm 
organizations, and the federal government met 
in Chicago in November, they too called for a 
national land-use program that included the 
federal purchase of submarginal lands.' 
The work of the national conference on 
land utilization bore fruit in 1932 with the 
formation of the National Land-Use Planning 
Committee, which Gray served as executive 
secretary, and which worked for the removal 
of submarginal lands from production. With 
the election of Franklin Delano Roosevelt to 
the presidency that year, land-use planning 
continued with the creation of the Land 
Planning Committee of the National Re-
sources Board, which called for a long-term 
land-use policy that would remove as many as 
seventy-five million acres from cultivation 
nationwide. It also concluded that "extensive 
areas" of the Great Plains were unsuited for 
cultivation. The Committee estimated that 
more than 6.5 million acres in the Great Plains 
needed to be returned to grass and that some 
16,000 farmers should be relocated.] 
About this same time, Chester Davis, 
administrator of the Agricultural Adjustment 
Administration (AAA), created a Program 
Planning Division that, with the support of 
Secretary of Agriculture Henry A. Wallace 
and others, he used to give government social 
scientists the opportunity to plan and imple-
ment a national land-use program. Gray 
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became chief of the Land Policy Section of the 
Program Planning Division while remaining 
head of the USDA's Division of Land Eco-
nomics within the Bureau of Agricultural 
Economics. He, therefore, had major responsi-
bility not only for developing a long-term land-
use program but also for determining the 
submarginal lands for purchase and reclama-
tion. As chief of the Land Policy Section, Gray 
also had the opportunity to implement the 
suggestions that had accumulated from the 
Division of Land Economics, the National 
Land-Use Planning Committee, and the Land 
Planning Committee. Soon, Gray's Land 
Policy Section became the nerve center for 
planning the land-use program.4 
Gray and others believed that a land-use 
program was needed in the Dust Bowl to 
enable acquisition of submarginal lands, con-
solidation of farms, relocation of inhabitants, 
, 
LAND UTILIZATION PROJECTS 
-
FIG. 1. The land utilization projects were part of the Roosevelt administration's national soil 
conservation program. By November 1940, land reclamation encompassed several hundred thousand acres in 
the Dust Bow!. Other land utilization projects were scattered across the nation. Courtesy Soil Conservation 
Service. 
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restoration of land, and the return of re-
claimed land to commercial use under the 
watchful eye of the federal government-all for 
the purpose of restoring submarginal cropland 
to grass in order to help end the dust storms 
and improve agriculture. Although the intent 
of federal land reclamation policy was clear, 
execution became difficult because it required 
private owners to sell their lands and federal 
officials to institute the conservation measures 
and managerial procedures that would prevent 
further soil erosion. No precedents existed for 
governmental planning and soil conservation 
on this grand scale. Even so, by autumn 1934 
the AAA had instituted a land-use program 
that included the purchase of submarginal 
lands in the Dust Bowl. Three projects, one in 
", 
.J 
New Mexico and two in Colorado, respec-
tively called the Mills and the Southern Otero 
and Southeastern Colorado Land Utilization 
Projects, exemplified the purpose, problems, 
and results of the New Deal's land-use program 
in the Dust Bowl. i 
PROBLEMS OF LAND ACQUISITION 
By January 1935, after three years of 
drought and dust and crop failure in north-
eastern New Mexico and southeastern Colora-
do, residents welcomed the federal land-use 
program. The wind had eroded some crop-
lands to the depth of the plowing, and grazing 
lands were blowing badly. To hold the soil on 
those wind-eroded lands, the AAA planned to 
OCTOBER 1,1938 
LAND UTILIZATION PROJECTS 
NEW MEXICO 
FIG. 2. In autumn 1934, the AAA began purchasing submarginal land in Harding County, New 
Mexico, for the Mills Land Utilization Project. Two years later, the project expanded to Colfax and Mora 
Counties. Courtesy Soil Conservation Service. 
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FIG. 3. In late 1934, the AAA made its first land purchase in southern Otero County, Colorado. The 
Southeastern Land Utilization Project in Baca and Las Animas Counties began in 1937. Courtesy Soil 
Conservation Service. 
purchase 64,440 acres of submarginal land 
from 148 individuals in Harding County, New 
Mexico. In southern Otero and Las Animas 
Counties in Colorado, the federal government 
planned to purchase 300,000 acres on which 
250 families lived and nonresidents owned 
approximately 45 percent of the land. In both 
areas, tax delinquencies were high. Harding 
County landowners or tenants were to be 
relocated on the Storrie Project near Las 
Vegas, New Mexico, or on the Middle Rio 
Grande Conservancy Project in the Rio Gran-
de Valley. The relocation site for Southern 
Otero and Las Animas County farmers had 
not yet been determined. Not everyone, 
however, would be removed from the project 
areas. Government officials believed the "bet-
ter" farmers, meaning those who were finan-
cially stable and owned productive croplands, 
would stay and lease the restored grasslands 
for livestock production. Policymakers in the 
AAA estimated the land in the Mills Project 
would cost the federal government between 
$2.00 and $4.75 per acre while Southern Otero 
Project land could be acquired for $1.50 to 
$2.50 per acre. 6 
Soon after the AAA selected the land 
utilization or reclamation areas in New Mexico 
and southern Colorado, agents met with 
landowners and residents to determine their 
support for the project and to explain land-use 
policy. Harding County, as well as Otero and 
Las Animas County, residents quickly showed 
an almost "unanimous desire" for the land-use 
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program. Landowners particularly were sup-
portive after learning that they would not be 
forced to sell their properties but would he 
given the opportunity to sell at the appraised 
price, based on the land's value for grazing 
purposes. The value of improvements would 
be determined by their condition. Govern-
ment officials also asked the Federal Land 
Bank to renegotiate mortgages when the 
appraised land value was less than the mort-
gage in order for the owner to receive some 
equity. Although federal officials hoped all 
lands within project boundaries would come 
under federal jurisdiction and planned to 
acquire or block-in as much as they could of 
the area within project boundaries in order to 
develop easily administered grazing districts, 
they recognized that private holdings would 
checkerboard the land-use areas.; 
Most residents and landowners within or 
nearby the Mills and Southern Otero reclama-
tion projects supported the land purchase 
concept, but some criticized land-use policy. 
Dissatisfaction developed because a few land-
owners hoped to sell their properties for more 
money than the government offered and 
because payment was not quickly forthcoming. 
A southeastern Colorado rancher, for exam-
ple, had invested $15.00 per acre on a section 
of land, but appraisers valued land in his area 
at only $2.00 to $3.00 per acre. Selling at that 
price, he believed, would turn him into a 
"pauper" and force him onto the relief rolls, 
and others in his situation would share the 
same fate. After enjoying years of adequate 
precipitation and bountiful harvests, farmers 
wanted prices commonly paid for land during 
good times, not the prices of the drought-
stricken, dust-laden, depression years. There-
fore, in late April 1935 a group of southern 
Otero County farmers petitioned the AAA to 
pay not less than $2.50 per acre for lands 
within the project area. S 
Norman G. Fuller, the project manager, 
was unsympathetic to this plea even though 
the AAA ultimately paid higher prices. Gray's 
Land Policy Section, he argued, had selected a 
portion of southern Otero County for a 
reclamation project because that area would 
not support farming and ranching under 
private ownership. Thus, to prevent abusive 
farming and grazing practices and to halt 
further wind erosion, federal ownership and 
management were necessary. Although many 
farmers and ranchers might have a large 
amount of capital invested in the land, federal 
policymakers felt no obligation to compensate 
them for unwise or over investments any more 
than they assumed the government was obli-
gated to reimburse businessmen for losses that 
they might incur.' 
In September 1935, a more serious, though 
brief, blow up occurred in Roy, New Mexico, 
over the Mills Project. Scattered rains, delayed 
payments for optioned lands, and rumors that 
the land, once restored to grass, would be 
rented at high prices to nonresident farmers 
and cattlemen caused a small group of land-
owners, tenants, and businessmen to petition 
for the termination of the reclamation project. 
Landowners who signed the petition charged 
that the federal government had appraised 
their properties too low and that the option 
prices would place them in an even more 
precarious financial position. They also ob-
jected to the "un-American" principle that 
required the relinquishment of deeds prior to 
payment for their lands. Moreover, they 
complained they had been misled about the 
legal expenses involved. Federal officials had 
implied that the government would pay the 
expenses for quieting titles and other legal. 
work, but the government deducted those 
costs from the agreed price. They also argued 
that federal officials had indicated the restored 
grasslands would be rented to residents at rates 
competitive with taxes paid on privately held 
or state-leased lands, rather than to "outsid-
ers" for "materially higher" lease fees. In 
addition, they maintained that those who sold 
their lands would be "dispossessed of homes" 
and would thereby create another problem for 
the federal government. I,) 
Although these were good reasons for 
second thoughts about granting purchase 
options to the federal government, return of 
rain was the real reason for the farmers' change 
of heart. At least the most hopeful of these 
generally optimistic plainsmen chose to believe 
that scattered rainfall in the early autumn of 
1935 heralded the end of the Dust Bowl. Some 
who had signed options now believed that 
they would be better off retaining possession of 
their lands rather than selling to the federal 
government and moving elsewhere. Perhaps 
cynically, but accurately, the editor of the Roy 
Record in Roy, New Mexico, reflected: "Know-
ing the propensity of the average mesa farmer 
to condemn the country when it is windy and 
dry, and then sing its praises at the first drop of 
rainfall, the Record many months ago predicted 
tough sledding for the land-use program. We 
said then if favorable conditions returned 
before the landowners were moved elsewhere, 
there would be a general clamor for cancella-
tion of the leases. And it has come to pass."!! 
D. R. W. Wagner-Smith, the Mills Project 
manager, tried to maintain control of the 
situation by taking a conciliatory attitude and 
by explaining federal policy. Wagner-Smith 
believed the farmers' dissatisfaction stemmed 
from payment delays for optioned lands and 
from the government's failure to develop a 
leasing policy that would favor residents with 
low rates. The latter problem, he contended, 
was the "spark which set off the explosion." He 
assured residents that the federal government 
would consult with them concerning leasing 
policy and that the land-use program would be 
administered on a "fair and equitable basis." 
Soon after, residents who favored the program 
called their own mass meeting to garner 
support for the project. Although those who 
petitioned for the return of their options did 
not attend allegedly because they feared "mass 
violence," the one hundred project supporters 
who did participate voiced hearty endorse-
ments for the Mills Land Utilization Project 
and voted to circulate their own petition 
favoring its completion. With support from the 
Roy Chamber of Commerce, other commu-
nity leaders, and the majority of area landown-
ers, work on the project continued. Sig-
nificantly, opposition to the Southern Otero 
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and Mills Projects did not stem from a 
philosophical rejection of New Deal reclama-
tion policy but rather from the landowners' 
perception that they were inequitably or 
slowly paid, and these objections were relative-
ly limited.!2 
Most people within the Mills and Southern 
Otero Projects had good reasons to be support-
ive. In the Mills area, 85 percent of the 
inhabitants were on relief. Of the 250 farms 
recommended for purchase in 1935, the ap-
praised value totaled $367,372 against mort-
gages that reached $250,000 for an average 
indebtedness of $1,469 per farm. Many land-
owners were far behind in their tax payments. 
By the end of 1934, 28 percent of the 1932 
taxes and 34 percent of the 1933 taxes still were 
delinquent. Most of these farmers had slight 
chance of regaining self-sufficiency, let alone 
commercial production. Overall, the people 
were destitute and lacked the basic necessities 
of life. Confronting economic problems such 
as these, the Resettlement Administration 
(RA) , which gained control of the land-use 
program on 1 May 1935, expanded the pur-
chase plans to 74,500 acres in September to 
give relief to even more landowners. More-
over, by reseeding 17,500 acres, the RA hoped 
to make life in that portion of the Dust Bowl 
less tenuous and disagreeable for those who 
remained.!l 
Similar tax and mortgage problems existed 
within the Southern Otero Project, where 90 
percent of the inhabitants were on relief and 
where 14,000 acres needed reseeding immedi-
ately. By mid-October 1935, however, the 
Resettlement Administration had received 
funds sufficient only for the purchase of 
150,000 acres-a substantial reduction from 
the original 300,000 acre purchase plan. But 
options for these lands had been obtained with 
little difficulty, and Fuller believed the federal 
government could purchase "practically every 
privately owned acre" within one or two years, 
if funds were available. Nevertheless, the 
reduction of the project area by half hindered 
the development of a conservation program 
where drought, tillage, and overgrazing had 
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exposed 70 percent of the land to wind 
erosion. 14 
Other problems developed when some 
farmers within the Southern Otero Project 
optioned their lands, then sought loans from 
local banks to finance resettlement. Those 
individuals had located specific land on which 
they wanted to reside, but they needed loans 
to purchase it in time to plant the next year's 
crop. Although local banks were cooperative, 
they were not willing to grant loans until the 
government checks, which the farmers in-
tended to use as security, arrived. Farmers on 
the Southern Otero and Mills Projects who 
had given the government options did not 
want to plant acreages that the federal govern-
ment would soon control, yet they could not 
wait a year or more for payment and resettle-
ment without cultivating their old lands. C. F. 
Clayton, chief of the Project Planning and 
Control Section in the Resettlement Adminis-
tration's Division of Land Utilization could 
not promise a time of payment. Bureaucratic 
lethargy and a long appraisal process did not 
enhance congressional support, and resettle-
ment delays cost the federal government 
additional planning time and money.IS 
Similar problems existed on the Mills 
Project. In April 1936 eighty-five families were 
ready to move, but the federal government did 
not have any place to send them. Those who 
had optioned lands were embittered and 
contended that the administration had broken 
faith with them. In late April the situation 
improved when the RA authorized Mills 
Project farmers who had optioned their lands 
to plant and harvest a crop even though 
payment might be made before the work was 
completed. At that time, the federal govern-
ment had paid for only 8,367 of 66,398 
optioned acres for a total expenditure of 
$31,376, and to speed the payment process one 
landowner even had to hire an attorney to 
plead his case in Washington. 16 
Once the land purchase program was 
underway, the next problem was to formulate 
a restoration plan for the wind-eroded land. 
From the beginning, Gray and his associates 
intended to remove the New Mexico and 
Colorado purchase areas from cultivation, 
restore the grass, and return the land to 
commercial use under "strict control." No one, 
however, was quite sure how to achieve those 
goals. No precedents existed to help federal 
officials develop a large-scale conservation 
program, and no one was certain how much 
time would be required to restore the grass-
lands. By February 1938, when the land 
utilization projects were under the jurisdiction 
of the Farm Security Administration (FSA), 
no one had developed a conservation program 
for the Southern Otero Project, and the 
federal government had done little to halt 
wind erosion in the land-use area, even though 
Fuller recommended that cover crops, such as 
sudan grass or milo, be planted to retard wind 
movement and to catch drifting soil. He also 
urged contracting with farmers who had 
optioned their lands to plant soil-holding crops 
and contracting with others to seed cover 
crops on lands of nonresidents. Although the 
FSA eventually implemented his suggestions, 
restricted relief funds consistently limited this 
conservation work. 17 
Similar problems plagued the Mills Project. 
Although the Resettlement Administration 
planned to remove buildings, reseed grass, 
construct stock-watering ponds, build roads, 
and develop recreational areas, little work had 
been completed by December 1936. Inade-
quate funding slowed contour listing and the 
seeding of sorghum cover crops until late June 
1937. The lands that were tilled and planted at 
that time would require relisting and replant-
ing in the spring, L. H. Hauter, regional 
director of the Resettlement Administration 
believed. Clearly, restoration of the grasslands 
would take a long time. 18 
Still, federal officials made progress. By July 
1937, workers had plowed 18,000 miles of 
contour furrows on the Southern Otero Proj-
ect. In addition, the Resettlement Administra-
tion supervised the construction of 120 miles 
of fence and fifteen livestock watering ponds 
and the removal of forty-two homesteads at a 
cost of$140,567. The RA planned to spend an 
additional $43,779 during the coming year for 
Works Progress Administration (WPA) em-
ployees to build another ninety-four miles of 
fence. Work on the Mills Project also pro-
ceeded on a modest scale. By 30 June 1937, 
employees had contour plowed 10,000 acres 
and had seeded more than 7,000 acres, proba-
bly with a sorghum nurse crop. Officials 
proclaimed that 40,000 acres were "revege-
tated," which probably meant the weeds had 
been allowed to hold the soil against the wind. 
Developmental work also involved the con-
struction of three hundred miles of fencing. By 
that time, the federal government had ac-
quired 67,647 acres at a cost of $274,034, or 
$4.05 per acre. It also had spent $118,847, or 
$1.76 per acre, for conservation work. The RA 
considered this expenditure reasonable for 
returning the land to grass. Still, limited funds 
and drought prevented a quick return of the 
grass to halt wind erosion. With only $30,000 
allocated for conservation work during fiscal 
1938, the RA planned to move fences and 
reorganize grazing areas. Project officials also 
planned to contour plow blowing fields and to 
hold the soil with forage crops, if sufficient 
moisture was present to sustain growth. They 
also intended to keep cattle off severely 
blowing lands so the vegetation would be 
"unmolested" if it grew. 1'l 
Similar conservation work began on the 
Southeastern Land Utilization Project in Colo-
rado, which included lands in Las Animas and 
Baca Counties, after project approval on 3 
November 1937. Although the original plan 
called for the purchaie of 377,000 acres, no 
one could say how much land eventually 
might be acquired. This reclamation project 
included some of the most severely wind-
eroded lands in the Dust Bowl. In Baca 
County alone nonresidents controlled 894,956 
acres, or 55.2 percent of the land, and a high 
percentage of resident landowners and tenants 
were on relief. By mid-March 1938, conserva-
tion work on project lands in Baca County 
had priority over the five other land utilization 
projects in the Dust Bowl. With the FSA 
pressuring the project manager to "show some 
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results," an "emergency treatment" program, 
which involved contour listing, chiseling, 
leveling, and reseeding, was planned for the 
spring "blow months." Contour furrowing 
would help prevent further loss of vegetation 
on wind-damaged and overgrazed pasture 
lands. If normal precipitation returned, federal 
officials hoped to lease the better lands after 
two or three years. Nevertheless, as late as June 
·1938, the FSA used most of its financial 
resources for land acquisition, rather than for 
the development of a conservation program. 
At that time, for example, officials budgeted 
$502,740 for land purchases but provided only 
$87,310 for conservation. Even so, workers 
planted cover crops on 40,000 acres in 1939, 
and officials optimistically hoped to complete 
the soil stabilization program the next year. 20 
Funding for conservation and land acquisi-
tion, however, always was less than requested 
or needed because Congress restricted much of 
the funding to aiding the unemployed. Conse-
quently, during June 1938 the FSA authorized 
conservation work only for the most severely 
eroded lands in contiguous blocks of 2,000 
acres or more. If landowners within or near the 
projects treated their lands to prevent blowing, 
however, project managers were permitted to 
conduct soil conservation work on adjacent 
federal lands to help prevent further wind 
erosion or damage to those private lands and 
thereby to enhance the economic position of 
resident operators. Even so, after the Soil 
Conservation Service (SCS) became responsi-
ble for the land utilization projects on 16 
October 1938, more than two years passed 
before the agency gave major attention to 
reseeding native grasses to obtain permanent 
stabilization of project lands in New Mexico 
and Colorado. 21 
GRAZING DISTRICTS 
While policymakers grappled with the 
problems of land purchase and reclamation, 
they also developed plans to return the re-
stored grasslands to private use. The New 
Dealers believed that federally controlled graz-
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ing would ensure the best use of the grasslands 
and enable cattle producers to develop eco-
nomically viable operations. Moreover, in 
times of prolonged drought, federal manage-
ment would enable quick adjustment to reduce 
the number of cattle or sheep that grazed on 
project grasslands and thereby prevent over-
grazing, denuded lands, and the return of the 
dust storms. 
Indeed, by 1935 federal management 
seemed necessary on the Southern Otero 
Project, where 15,500 sheep grazed on pastures 
sufficient for only 4,000 head. Although the 
3,700 cattle present were below the 4,500-head 
limit for the project, policymakers were deter-
mined that the carrying capacity would not 
jeopardize the grass during times of drought. 
Moreover, pasture rotation needed to be 
strictly enforced to prevent overgrazing and 
exposure of the soil to the wind. Federal 
officials planned to reduce the livestock to an 
appropriate number by the 1938 grazing 
season. In time, New Dealers hoped that 
resident livestockmen would form grazing 
associations that would rent the grasslands 
and work with the project manager to develop 
plans for the best range management and to 
determine equitable leasing rates. The federal 
government would issue permits that specified 
the number of livestock and the grazing period 
for the leased lands. In the case of leases to 
individuals, the applicant was to be a "viable 
land owner" or resident engaged in farming or 
ranching who owned the livestock. Monthly 
grazing fees per head of $.17 for cattle, $.22 for 
horses, and $.04 for sheep were payable 
semiannually on 1 May and 1 November. 
Livestockmen were not to place salt near water 
holes, nor were they to bed sheep in the same 
place for more than three continuous nights 
from April to October, to prevent overgrazing. 
No one could erect a permanent corral, and 
livestockmen were responsible for the mainte-
nance of fences and ponds within their lease 
areas. " 
Federal officials developed similar 
guidelines for the Mills Project. By the spring 
of 1937, Gray, now director of the Division of 
Land Utilization within the Resettlement 
Administration, had designated the Mills 
Project a "Grazing Reserve." "Grazing dis-
tricts" within the reserve were available for 
lease to any individual or association engaged 
in ranching or farming in or near the area. 
Local livestock producers, who in general were 
not interested in forming grazing associations, 
would receive preference for grazing permits. 
Ranchers who depended solely upon livestock 
for their livelihood were to be granted grazing 
permits for 125 animal units on project lands 
while those who operated diversified farms 
could acquire permits for eighty animal units 
until the carrying capacity of the grasslands 
had been reached. If drought forced a reduc-
tion in the number of animals grazing on 
project lands, the RA could require livestock-
men to reduce their herds over a three-year 
period with a one-third reduction occurring 
each year. Livestock producers could appeal all 
reductions to the regional director of the land 
utilization projects in Amarillo, Texas, who 
transmitted those he approved to the secretary 
of agriculture. The $2 per animal grazing fee 
equalled the prevailing rate for privately leased 
land in the Mills area. Although federal 
officials recognized the advantages of long-
term permits for agricultural planning, they 
did not intend to issue such permits until a 
comprehensive conservation program had 
been formulated. They expected the Mills and 
Southeastern Projects to be self-liquidating 
within ten to fifteen years." 
FUNDING PROBLEMS 
By spring 1939, reclamation still proceeded 
slowly in southeastern Colorado. Funds were 
nearly exhausted for conservation work on the 
Southeastern Land Utilization Project. The 
SCS plans for June and July involved merely 
seeding cover crops to stabilize blowing soil. 
The agency had hired thirty farmers with 
tractors to do the planting, but with only 
$8,000 available, each tractor could run only 
ten days, halting planting about mid-June. The 
SCS needed at least $26,000 to continue 
planting until July 25-the date beyond which 
germination was limited. By the end of July, 
only 4,000 acres had been contour furrowed in 
southern Otero County at an expenditure of 
$13,640. Cost prohibited similar work on 
another 100,000 acres. Optioned land was 
often saved because the federal government 
encouraged farmers to put it into the Agricul-
tural Conservation Program, which provided 
reclamation funds under the Soil Conserva-
tion and Domestic Allotment Act of 1936, but 
the federal government usually had to stabilize 
the worst lands because local farmers would 
not undertake that task.24 
Funding problems continued to plague the 
development of the land utilization projects in 
Colorado. The Soil Conservation Service 
preferred to hire local farmers because they 
had the needed equipment and because this 
policy built community goodwill, enabled 
farmers to earn extra money, and permitted 
the agency to avoid the procurement and 
maintenance of equipment. WPA funds, how-
ever, could not be spent to hire farmers with 
tractors; they could be used only to hire the 
unemployed. On the Southern Otero Project, 
Fuller could not see any justification for 
spending $30,000 to purchase the tractors and 
grain drills needed so that fifty or seventy-five 
men could be employed for two months 
planting grass seed. Moreover, Public Works 
Administration (PW A) funds only could be 
spent for heavy construction and equipment, 
not for conservation work such as listing, 
contour plowing, and planting. Furthermore, 
the Civilian Conservation Corps did not have 
sufficient equipment for reseeding project 
lands, and WP A and PW A monies could not 
be used to buy equipment for the CCc. 2i 
Similar problems existed on the Mills 
Project. By February 1939, funding shortages 
convinced project officials to purchase only 
the minimal acreage necessary to bring wind 
erosion under control and to ensure the proper 
use of the land. Although the SCS did not 
indicate the acreage reduction that could be 
made, agency officials believed a cutback 
would permit financially sound local operators 
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to acquire a portion of the optioned lands and 
thereby increase the size and economic viabili-
ty of their agricultural operations. In fiscal 
1939, only $5,959 in WPA funds and $708.30 
in PW A funds were available for conservation 
work, and project administrators could see no 
alternative to reducing the size of the Mills 
Project. During fiscal 1940, they had only 
$4,819 in WP A funds available for conserva-
tion work, but with restrictions on its use 
identical to those placed on the projects in 
southeastern Colorado, no reseeding, fence 
construction, contour plowing, or farm pond 
construction could be completed. The onset of 
a new war did not improve funding, and the 
SCS terminated land purchases after February 
1943 except for small acquisitions to block-in 
an area.'" 
RESETTLEMENT 
The resettlement of families from project 
lands was the most controversial but least 
serious problem attendant on the projects. 
Inadequate funding, payment delays, procedu-
ral changes, unclear objectives, and insuffi-
cient areas for relocation made an early 
shambles of this aspect of the land-use pro-
gram. Between January 1938 and July 1941, 
the federal government purchased 581,696 
acres in the southern Great Plains, much of 
which was in the Dust Bowl. Only 29.3 
percent of that acreage was grazed or culti-
vated at the time of purchase; the remaining 
acreage was abandoned. Resident owners 
occupied only 6.7 percent of that area while 
tenants held 10 percent of the land, thus 
leaving 83.1 percent of the land unoccupied. 
Although the resettlement program was con-
troversial nationwide, the federal government 
did not force a large number of owners and 
tenants off Dust Bowl lands. Apparently, most 
farmers within the project areas moved with 
their own funds and relocated in places of their 
own choosing rather than accept federal land 
elsewhere. 2; 
ASSESSMENT 
Not everyone across the nation or in the 
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Dust Bowl supported the reclamation pro-
gram. Some journalists, businessmen, and 
farmers, for example, argued that the land 
utilization projects would ruin the local econ-
omy and destroy the tax base. The critics, 
however, were a minority. Most Dust Bowl 
residents, like those near or within other land-
use projects, supported the goals of the federal 
government and the work of Gray and his 
associates. Certainly, the Department of Agri-
culture and other agencies, such as the Re-
settlement Administration, Farm Security 
Administration, Works Progress Administra-
tion, Civilian Conservation Corps, and the 
Federal Emergency Relief Administration, 
helped farmers improve their soil conservation 
practices in the Dust Bowl and remain on the 
land until the rains returned. The Soil Conser-
vation Service particularly was instrumental in 
helping stabilize the land as well as in teaching 
farmers and ranchers the best techniques to 
conserve the soil. 18 
Because of those efforts, and with the 
return of near normal precipitation during the 
late 1930s and early 1940s, the grass grew once 
again, the dust settled, and the work of the 
SCS was much easier than in the past. 
Certainly, the land-use projects in New Mexi-
co and Colorado were not capable of solving 
all of the economic and social problems in 
those portions of the Dust Bowl. As part of the 
Roosevelt administration's national soil con-
servation program, however, the land utiliza-
tion projects in New Mexico and Colorado 
helped to end the dust storms, restore wind-
eroded land, and return the region to a sound 
agricultural base. Moreover, these land utiliza-
tion projects and the newly organized conser-
vation districts encouraged improved 
conservation practices on private lands once 
normal precipitation returned to the Dust 
Bowl." 
In retrospect, the purchase of submarginal 
land, the restoration of the grass, and the wise 
management of the grasslands enabled the 
federal government to ensure better use of the 
land than ever before. These efforts, of course, 
took time. Just as the land could not be 
purchased nor the grass restored immediately, 
many years were needed for this land-use 
policy to show successful results. Indeed, the 
Soil Conservation Service maintained control 
of the projects until November 1953, when 
administrative authority passed to the Forest 
Service. In 1960 the USDA recognized the 
importance of these reclamation projects to 
the national soil conservation program when it 
created the Kiowa National Grassland from 
the Mills Land Utilization Project and the 
Comanche National Grassland from the 
Southern Otero and Southeastern Colorado 
Projects. Today, the Kiowa and Comanche 
National Grasslands serve not only as grazing 
lands but also provide wildlife habitat, mineral 
reserves, and recreation areas. Above all, the 
Kiowa and Comanche National Grasslands 
remain monuments to a grand experiment in 
state planning and land reclamation in the 
Dust Bowl. hl 
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The author is grateful for the aid that he 
received from Douglas Helms, historian, Soil Con-
servation Service, during the preparation of this 
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